



Sophist

Plato , Nicholas P. White (Translator)

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A fluent and accurate new translation of the dialogue that, of all Plato's works, has seemed to speak most directly to the interests of contemporary and analytical philosophers. White's extensive introduction explores the dialogue's central themes, its connection with related discussions in other dialogues, and its implication for the interpretation of Plato's metaphysics.

Sophist Details

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From Reader Review Sophist for online ebook

Jeenar ????? says

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????????? ??? ?? ?????????????? ?????? ??? ??????????. "

MJD says

It can get a bit dense at times and lacks the wit and humor of some other dialogues. Requires close reading.

Timothy Warnock says

By the middle of the book here's what I really wanted to see happen:

STRANGER: There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge?

THEAETETUS: There can be no greater.

STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure?

THEAETETUS: Naturally.

STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed?

PUNCH

STRANGER: OW!

STRANGER: ...

STRANGER: Did you just punch me in the face?

THEAETETUS: Yes, in the nose.

STRANGER: That REALLY hurt!

THEAETETUS: Sorry, but I had a justified true belief that punching you in the face would finally make this interesting. I've been saying "yes", and "very true" for over an hour now and you haven't communicated anything of testable value. You've assumed a definition of knowledge and seem to be under the impression that through deduction you can arrive at an absolute truth that would somehow settle all further inquiry. You've provided not a single conjecture that I, or anyone listening, could ever evaluate, test, or even attempt to falsify.

STRANGER: AGH, my nose is bleeding...

THEAETETUS: You're right, that was uncalled for. Please, go on using sophistry to tell me why sophistry is bad.

But that never happened.

Here's something fun, filter out everything Theaetetus says, it goes like this,

...

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them?

THEAETETUS: Very true.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: Yes.

THEAETETUS: Yes, it is often called so.

THEAETETUS: By all means.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: Most true.

THEAETETUS: Certainly.

THEAETETUS: To be sure.

THEAETETUS: True.

THEAETETUS: Granted.

THEAETETUS: Very true

THEAETETUS: There are certainly the two kinds which you describe.

THEAETETUS: Very good.

THEAETETUS: By all means.

THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly.

...

And so on for the entire dialogue.

Perhaps out of boredom, or perhaps trying to distract myself from hoping the stranger gets punched in the face, I wondered if every "True" and "Very true" could be deciphered as some kind of code or riddle-- maybe there is a hidden message encoded in repetitive affirmations. Or maybe I'm just desperately looking for something of value in this text...

Anyway, this is not a dialogue (as we use the word), but instead a diatribe against sophists; ironically characterizing "sophists" for doing exactly what Plato, as the "stranger", was doing via this dialectic approach.

At one point I had to stop because I thought maybe I was reading a farcical comedy. I kept an open mind, but every page became harder and harder to get through. Hours of dialectic-glop and semantic entanglements. I'll assume some of that was a problem of translation, but still, a punch in the face would have made the whole thing much more interesting.

Thomas says

Sophist is not the most beautiful dialogue in the canon, but it is important, and this is an excellent translation. Sophist follows on the heels of *Theaetetus*, which explores how error occurs when the categories of thought are confused. *Sophist* examines how those categories interact with each other in an effort to locate where the Sophist hides: in non-being. But first the Stranger has to resolve a logical obstacle: how can the Sophist hide in non-being, when on the face of it non-being simply *is not*?

The Eleatic Stranger takes over where Socrates leaves off in *Theaetetus* and demonstrates over the course of the dialogue how non-being does exist, and furthermore, how it is interwoven with being. Where Protagoras is refuted in *Theaetetus* for proposing that human understanding is a relative and changing matter, Parmenides is refuted in *Sophist* for proposing that it is eternal and changeless. What the Eleatic Stranger proposes (and it's important that it is he and not Socrates who does this) is that the case is not either Change or Rest, Being or Non-Being, Same or Other -- it is both/and in all these cases.

The argument is logically complicated because these difficulties reside in the categories of language, but upon taking these apart it becomes clearer. Where *Theaetetus* shows the impossibility of perfect knowledge, *Sophist* shows why and how this is so -- it is due to the categories (the "Forms") and how we think and communicate. On a theoretical level we expect that perfect knowledge is possible because things are what they are. True statements require a correspondence to a certain and stable state of affairs, otherwise what we say at one moment is not longer true as the state of affairs has changed and the statement is no longer true. We project this requirement upon the world because that is the way we think and speak. The Eleatic Stranger shows us the danger of doing this -- ignoring non-being allows the sophist to run free and hide in the interstices of our categories of thought.

Fun stuff.

Curtainthief says

Leave it to Plato to ask a simple question - Who is the sophist? - and create an entire ontology as a bi-product.

Vatroslav Herceg says

Naprijed, ZGB. 1975.

Preveo Milivoj Sironi?. Sironi? je super dopunio prijevod fusnotama u kojima je ukazao na dvosmislenosti i problematici određenih mjesta u tekstu. Primjerice;

"Teetet- Uistinu se, stran?e, ?ini da je istinito ono u po?etku re?eno o sofisti da je to vrsta ljudi koju je teško uloviti. ?ini se da je on pun zaklona..."

Rije? "zaklona" u mati?nom jeziku posjeduje duhovitu crtu dvosmislenosti, "problema" na starogr?kom ozna?ava i "zaklon", "zid", "barijera" ali tako?er i "prijeporno pitanje" odnosno "problem".

Srpski lokativ, "o sofisti", je zanimljiv jer Sironi? prevodi (i)jekavštinom te ina?e ne baca srbizme.

Simpat?ni su ti jezi?ni pulsevi bivše države u jugoslavenskim izdanjima.

Srboliki su tako?er oblici nominativa "vrst" i "osnov" te je srbolika rije? "protivurje?je" koja se javlja usporedno s rije?ju "proturje?enje".

U vezi samog djela valja istaknuti da je vo?a dijaloga nazvan misteriozno, "Stranac". Platon u svojim djelima ina?e uvijek navodi Sokrata kao najve?u facu u raspravi.

Cijelo djelo je napisano protiv sofizma.

U vezi sadržaja izdvojio bih par zanimljivosti.

Prva je;

"Stranac- Kažem da što god ima neku snagu da ili djeluje na bilo koju drugu stvar ili da trpi i najmanje djelovanje od najneznatnije stvari, pa bilo to i samo jedanput, kažem da sve to zaista ima bitak. Postavljam definiciju bi?a da ono nije ništa drugo osim mogu?nost."

Ba?eni citat baca na egzistencijalizam, bivstvovanje je mogu?nost, kretanje, promjena koja može biti aktivna.

Kul je tako?er kada Stranac baca ove umovitosti;

"I mi smo tijelom putem osjeta u vezi s postojanjem, a dušom putem mišljenja s pravom egzistencijom, za koju kažete da je uvijek ista i nepromjenjiva, a postojanje da je svaki ?as druk?ije."

Platon se u "Sofistu" doti?e i jezikoslovlja govore?i, kroz Stranca, da je niz sastavljen od isklju?ivo glagola ili isklju?ivo imenica neskladan odnosno besmislen. Govor sa?injavaju glagoli i imenice u skladu.

Sociološki, a i kulturološki, je zanimljivo kada Stranac govori da pu?ka vjerovanja zastupaju da priroda stvara sva smrtna bi?a te "tjelesa bez života topiva i netopiva" za razliku od umnih koji tvrde da navedno nastade od boga (str.186). Bog se javlja u jednini, da li su to krš?ani kasnije izmijenili? Zanimljivo je tako?er da pu?ka vjerovanja vjeruju prirodi a ne bogu.

Pro?itajte "Sofista"!

Tim says

Sophist is one of the few Platonic dialogues which don't have Socrates as the main character (all are from the late period). This seems to offer Plato some advantages, especially for this book's purposes. Using the Eleatic Visitor as the main speaker allows Plato to make sustained arguments consisting of series of positive statements as opposed to the Socratic character's standard approach, claiming to know nothing and play the midwife of others' thoughts – asking questions, testing answers, usually showing their inadequacy, and typically ending inconclusively. Arguably Plato could have used Socrates the same way he used the Visitor, but that would have been odd as Socrates is the main speaker in the Theaetetus, Sophist's predecessor in a trilogy, in which Socrates is true to his old form. Sophist is an attack on Plato's adversaries, the sophists, and on some of their most important (and to Plato, very dangerous) word or logic puzzles. His animus towards sophists, and towards poets, might seem excessive, but we should remember that he saw both as educators offering falsehoods, in some cases in the guise of truth and in others with a relativistic view of truth. And this was at a time when disinterested, rational investigation into truth was new and insecure. For some it was seen as impious, probably for others a potential threat to society and the state. Another danger that seems to have been quite real was the conflating of philosophy and sophistry (as we see in Aristophanes' Clouds, and as Plato's Apology seems to suggest, though in reality they were perhaps less distinct than Plato might have us believe). Regarding at least some sophists, the main issue was the reality and importance of truth and the importance of pursuing truth regardless of outcome as opposed to developing and teaching skill in persuasion regardless of truth. The sophists' puzzles posed serious problems for Plato, causing fundamental aspects of existence (being and non-being, rest and motion, one and many, etc.) to appear hopelessly mired in contradictions and confusions, leading among other things to relativism about truth and morality.

Primary among these problems was confusion about being (i.e. the word "is") and manipulation of the confusion of "is" as denoting existence with its denoting a thing's having particular qualities. With this difference long clear to us, it's hard to understand how the brightest minds in ancient Greece were stumped by it, but it was a major problem that Plato seems to have effectively clarified in Sophist. Another main problem in sophistical arguments was the equation of "not being x" with "being the opposite of x." Plato pretty effectively clarifies that "not" indicates difference but not necessarily contrariety. He also, very importantly, believes he establishes that we can talk about things that don't exist without necessarily contradicting ourselves. I'm not sure he established this in a way that would decisively undermine the sophists, but this issue was central to Plato's problem with them. Some sophists claimed there couldn't be false belief or speech because no one could think or say "that which is not" since "that which is not" has no share in "being" (this picks up an issue from the Theaetetus, while Sophist in general is largely directed against Parmenides, with some mostly indirect connection to the dialogue named after him). We might say that Plato demonstrated, or believed he demonstrated, that at least some things which don't exist (e.g. things that are false) are nevertheless available to thought and speech.

Another main issue Plato tackles, also without the greatest clarity, is that qualities (possibly the Forms or Ideas from his earlier works) can blend with each other (this revisits a central problem from the Parmenides, at least if we take it as dealing with the Forms). He doesn't provide much of an account of how this works, but in a proto-Aristotelian manner he doesn't seem to need to so he doesn't bother; he gives some examples which appear to adequately demonstrate that this "blending" happens in at least some situations and then forgoes further proof as he's achieved his primary objectives: demonstrating that things can either "be" in the sense that they exist or they can "be" possessors of qualities; they can "not be" in possession of quality x but this doesn't mean they have (or are) its opposite; they can "not be" something without meaning they don't

exist; we can discuss things that “are not” without contradicting ourselves or saying nothing; and things can possess a multiplicity of differing qualities, “blending with each other,” without this being inherently contradictory or problematic. At least this is my understanding of what I take to be the main points of the dialogue. (The first third of the book is an entertaining search for a definition of “sophist,” in which we also meet the Eleatic Visitor and are introduced to his “method of division.”)

The Visitor seems to speak for Plato much more clearly than the character Socrates elsewhere, and it’s hard to imagine Plato taking on the tasks of this dialogue with the usual Socratic limitations and dialectical method. Decisively refuting the sophists on the points addressed was critical to Plato’s project (there is truth, it’s absolute and unchanging, and it very possibly can be discovered and understood by man; there also must be falsehood – both deceit and misunderstanding or ignorance; similarly, justice and knowledge are real, and attempting to pursue and understand them is not necessarily destined to be fruitless). But we also find the Visitor as the main speaker in *Statesman*, while Parmenides had been the main speaker in that dialogue (with a young Socrates largely on the defensive), and Socrates doesn’t even appear in *The Laws*. *Timaeus* and *Critias* are essentially monologues by those characters, and even in *Philebus*, with Socrates as the main speaker, he asserts positive doctrine rather than questioning others and demolishing their definitions and arguments. It seems Plato in his late period needed something his earlier Socratic character and method could no longer provide him (with the exception of the *Theaetetus*, perhaps acting as a coda for the old Socrates and an introduction to the trilogy which apparently was to include *Sophist*, *Statesman*, and the unwritten *Philosopher*).

I mentioned a proto-Aristotelian aspect in this dialogue; it seems there are several of these in the *Parmenides* and *Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman* trilogy: The logic puzzles in *Parmenides* almost demand an analysis and categorization of logical fallacies, for which a formal logic would be a prerequisite. The Eleatic Visitor’s method of division (used in *Sophist* and *Statesman*) is a step away from Socratic dialectic and a step towards Aristotelian logic. The Visitor also insists on differentiation between general and specific, and seems to be moving towards something like Aristotle’s genus and species. The unmoved mover makes a very brief appearance in *Statesman*’s cosmological myth, which also includes something like an initial abstract of Aristotle’s *Politics* (i.e. a survey and critique of existing political systems). And there’s also something similar to Aristotle’s beloved doctrine of the mean in *Statesman*. To be fair to Aristotle, no one else in the Academy took these hints or produced the remarkable body of work he did, and there are plenty of things in Aristotle, e.g. his causality, which don’t seem to have any obvious precedents in Plato. Certainly Aristotle’s formal logic was one of history’s great intellectual achievements, regardless of the extent of the foundation Plato provided. And of course the mindsets of the two men were very different, not least in the place (or lack thereof) of empiricism in their respective worlds of thought.

Perhaps it should be noted that our view of the sophists may be excessively negative and otherwise unbalanced largely due to Plato’s well-preserved and brilliant dialogues which so often savage the group. It’s unlikely we’ll ever have adequate knowledge of them to be able to independently assess Plato’s characterizations. But perhaps it’s worth keeping in mind Plato’s harsh view of the poets, who we do know, when considering his even harsher view of the sophists.

Seth says

A Sophist is a hunter of young boys by the way.

Foad says

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Luís C. says

Being and Non-Being

Plato begins his dialogue with the purpose of defining what is the sophist. In its various partial investigations, I believe that all of the most important is that the accounts of the nature of the **"non-being"**. Contrary to what we can intuit the "non-being" is not necessarily the opposite of "being", but only something other than "being". In my view, this is the central argument that allows the philosopher continue and correctly complete their investigation into the being of the sophist.

Lisbon Book-Fair 2016.

Thompson says

This dialogue is the companion dialogue to Theatetus. Plato continues his thoughts on his theory of knowledge.

Jesse says

This is the best example of dialectic reasoning. Heidegger masturbated over his copy; you should too.

Sah Angoluan says

Sophist dialogue was primarily for explaining the nature of Sophist is, after Socrates asked the Stranger, whose name weren't even mentioned, about whether in his place (Elea), Sophist, statemen and philosophers are one or three different names. At first, I presupposed that the dialogue will tackle primarily on those three, but after reading it, understand it with all my might. The dialogue was all about the Sophist, maybe thats the reason why does this dialogoue was named after it.

The stranger and Theodorus, has able to lay down six points about the nature of the Sophist, but before that, what amuse me to this Stranger is how he project or explain his first example. His first example was about an angler, what is he is doing? If he has an art or nothing or have somewhat a power to do what he was doing.

The stranger presupposes that the angler has an art, and explain that art has two kinds, a creative art, he who brings into existence something that did not exist before and the other one is the acquisitive, he who mould things that existed before. They both agreed (Theodorus and the Stranger) that the angler is an acquisitive art, as the angler didn't produce what he is having. Then the stranger divided the acquisitive into two parts, the exchange, by means of exchanging things, and the other is by conquest. And the conquest is later divided into two, by means of open force, fighting or by secret force, hunting. Then hunting then in turn divided into two, hunting the living or hunting lifeless prey. And the hunting the living is then divided into land-animals hunting and water-animals hunting. And further divide the water-animal hunting by two, in the way how they hunt their prey, one using nets (in which the Stranger said 'capture with enclosures') and one takes their preys by blows (or striking) and later said the land-animals hunting is too many to divide. Using this division, the Stranger has explained what does the angler do, it is, an acquisitive art that conquest or taking by force, water-animals by the means of striking. And using this division or method again, the stranger has explain what is the art of the Sophist. He explains that the Sophist were acquisitive (not creative), hunting their living prey (not fighting and not hunting lifeless prey), just like the anglers but their paths diverge when it comes to what type of animals they hunt, the angler hunts water-animals while Sophist hunts land-animals. The stranger then further divides this into two, tame animals which includes man and the other is wild animals. Than according to the Stranger taming can be either violence or art of persuasion, and that art 1 Plato trans, by Jowett, Benjamin, 'Sophist' retrived from <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/sophist...> on date December 2, 2012

of persuasion can either be private or public, private for either hiring or by means of gifts, giving gifts. Thus, after sub-dividing of all this, the Stranger and Theodorus has met their first point explaining what is the nature of Sophist is, 'his art may be traced as a trace of the appropriative, acquisitive family- which hunts animals,-living-land-tame animals; which hunts man,-privately-for hire,-taking money in exchange-having the semblance of education'. Which of course while reading it has met my exact definition to what Sophist do.

What then amuse again is other point that the stranger did to explain the Sophistry, being said that the acquisitive were divided into two, exchange and conquest, and exchange were divided into two, namely giving and selling, and selling was then divided into selling own production or selling other peoples product and these two (selling own production and selling other peoples product) can be either in retailing or by means of exchange, exchanging for food for the body (such as medicines) or exchanging for food for the soul (for amusements or for the sake of instruction). And exchanging for the food of the soul can be also divided into two, by virtue or by knowledge. According to the stranger, Sophist are those whose art may now be (also) traced from the art of acquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of the soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue. Well, indeed, as i remembered Sophist were dependent for livelihood upon the tuition fees which they thus received² from their students.

What was new to me after reading this dialogue is that the Sophist were known to be the minister of purification. Well, maybe i have come across to that when I was studying Ancient Philosophy or reading the book Sophist world. But if they are indeed the minister of purification why does still the Sophist are considered one of the lowest and controversals? Well, just like the dialogue or what was written on this dialogue, Sophist being the purger of the souls, who cleared away notions of obstructive to knowledge is very doubtful.

Thus, if i may conclude, the Stranger and Theodorus dialogue had come up with six points, one is that the Sophist paid hunter after wealth and youth. Two, they were merchants in the goods of the soul. Third, he had turned out to be a retailer of the same sort of wares. Fourth, they manufactured the learned wares which they sold. Fifth, they belonged to the fighting class, and was further distinguished as a hero of debate, who professed the eristic art and six, that they were purger if the souls. After this six point, after the Stranger and the Theodorus has come up to another path of explaining Sophistry, it is difficult for me to comprehend what they dialogue explains to be. But I do understand that the Sophist were disputers, that they seems to know all things that they dispute, but they only have apparent or conjectural knowledge of all things. They dialogue

has also come up with the non-being, which of course my professor wants us to understand as his intrusion of reading this dialogue was primarily for understand what non-being is. They do said that ‘non-being’ is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable. Non-being is nothing.
2 Fung Yu-Lan, ‘A History of Chinese Philosophy’, (China, The North-China Daily News, Shanghai, 1937), page 53

Lia says

Clearly I’ll have to read this again. I suspect God kills a kitten every time Theaetetus says “clearly” “definitely,” “of course.” BECAUSE NONE OF THAT IS CLEAR AT ALL.

I became interested in *Sophist* through Heidegger. I’ve read a bunch of Plato’s dialogues before, I can’t remember which, I read them without any guide — they impressed me as mildly amusing, beyond that it’s completely mysterious to me how anyone can walk away with any sort of certainty, or conclusion. Plato always leaves me feeling “trolled.”

The “nice” (?) thing about reading backwards from modern “signposts” is that I get to appreciate other people’s interpretive efforts. I don’t think I could have taken this dialogue very seriously if I didn’t know it inspired so many generations of philosophers, and now I’m burning with desire to read Heidegger’s lecture on *Sophist*, and his investigation of “beings, even though I’ll have to learn to read Greek first.

And I suspect that’s the whole point — not to indoctrinate readers with any kind of solidified “knowledge,” but to inspire more dialogues, investigations, contemplations.

I don’t usually rate books I don’t understand, but I think, for the psychological effect it created — bafflement commingled with desires to dig deeper — it’s justifiable to give it ????????? .

Bülent Çallı says

“Bilmek ve bilinmek sizce etki midir, etkilenme midir; yoksa her ikisi birden midir?”

Platon, Sofist.s.80

Antik Çağ’ın lanetli biraderleri olan sofistler, ilk başta, bilgiyi sorgulayarak ve üpheyi düşünceye sokarak felsefe sahnesine nefis bir girişi yapmışlardır. Pek kısa bir zaman içerisinde bu sorgulama ve üphe tehlikeli bir aklı yürütmeye ve sonra da kullanışlı, kaypak bir ilkeye dönüşü: Düşünmek, var olan bir şeyi düşündürmektir. Yanlış düşünmek ise var olmayan bir şeyi düşündürmektir. Var olmayan bir şey düşünülemez. O halde yanlış düşünmek ve dolayısıyla yanlış konuşmak mümkün değildir. Bu ilkeden hareketle çağın yolda Sofistler, sanatlar ve hatta erdemleri, kendileri bunlara hâkim olmasalar bile dil becerisiyle başkalarına para kazandırmakta öğretmeye başladılar. Sonunda Protagoras, işi Atina’nın pek sevgili tanrıları’nın gerçekte var olup olmadıkları’nın bilinemeyeceğine kadar vardırmışa ehirden sürüldü ve eserleri yakıldı. Sofistlerin eserlerinin yakılması işini bizzat Platon’un idare ettiğini söylenir.

Bundan Önce 365 yılında yazıldığı düşünülen Sofist, Platon’un gençlik dönemine denk gelir ve tahminen Theaitetos’tan sonra, Politeia’dan önce yazılmıştır. Yani aslında, bu sırayla yapılacak bir okumanın daha

faydal? ve anla??l?r olaca?? s?ylenabilir. Buna ra?men Sofist, sade ve keskin yap?s? ile tek ba??na dahi, d?üünce ile ilgilenen ve bu yolda susam??lar? bekleyen sakın ama derin bir p?nar gibi.

Platon, Sofist’in ilk bölümünde Sherlock Holmes’ü aratmayan, incelikli bir mant?k yürütme ve ba? döndüren keskin bir dikotomi ile sofistin pe?ine d?üüyor. Bu takip esnas?nda Platon, önce sofist ve avc? aras?nda bir benzerlik kuruyor. (Bu k?s?mlar kitab?n en e?lenceli k?s?mlar?.) Bu esnada anlat?lan, takip etmesi keyifli o temel dikotomiyi buraya aktarmaya çal??ay?m:

Avc?:

Deniz avc?s? – Kara avc?s?,

Kara Avc?s?:

Yabani hayvan avlayan – Evcil hayvan, insan avlayan,

Evcil hayvan, insan avlayan:

Silahla – ?kna ederek,

?kna ederek:

Topluluk içinde – Bire bir görü?erek,

Bire bir görü?erek:

Hediye almak için- Kazanç sa?lamak için,

Kazanç sa?lamak için:

Geçim için (Dalkavuk) – Para için (Sofist)

??te Platon ele geçmesi zor Sofist’i bu ?ekilde derdest ediyor ama gölgelerde dola?may? seven Sofist yine de elinden kurtulmay? ba?ar?yor. Eser boyunca bu dikotomiye ba?ka dallar?ndan budakland?ran Platon, Sofist’in pe?ini b?rakm?yor. Platon’un as?l meselesi Sofist’i ele geçirmek de de?il zaten. O, sofist av?n? bahane ederek aslen Parmenides’in “var olmayan?n var olmamas?” ?eklinde ifade edebilece?imiz tezini çürütmeye çal??yor. Kitab?n ikinci k?sm? bu metafizik konuya ayr?lm?? Platon var gücüyle yanl??n mümkünlü?ünü ispat etmeye çal??yor ve sofistlerin en temel ilkesini diyalektik modeli kullanarak çürütüyor.

?leti?im Yay?nlar?’n?n Siyaset Felsefesi Klasikleri serisi içinde 2016’da ilk bask?s?n? yapan bu yeni çeviriyi ben çok be?endim. Kitaba Emile Chambry’nin vaziyeti güzel özetleyen bir önsözü ve Ahmet ?nsel’in sofistleri a’c?c?k da olsa savunan sonsözü de eklenmi?. Bunlar ho? detaylar. Eseri okumak için temel bir felsefe altyap?s? gerekiyor. Özellikle de ikinci bölümde yer alan “var-olmayan” ile ilgili metafizik diyaloglar? anlamland?rabilmek için. Ama bu basit e?ik a??l?rsa, Cenap Karakaya’n?n duru, okuyana yard?m eden çevirisi ile Sofist ?eker gibi bir okumaya dönü?üyor.
